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PROVISIONS

BY WILL

FOR

POSTHUMOUS

CHILDREN.-The recent case of

OR AFTER-BORN

Newlin's Estate, 209 Pa. 456,

19o4, apparently marks a radical departure in Pennsylvania
from a settled rule of construction of the Statute of Wills (Act
of 1833) where the rights of posthumous children are involved.
As the effect of the decision is to overrule the earlier cases on
the subject, it is necessary to understand definitely the previous attitude of the court towards such provisions in order to
determine whether or not the decision mentioned is consonant
with established legal principles and sound reason. It was with
that thought in mind that the following examination of the authorities was written.
A child, born after the making of a will by its parent, who
has died without adapting that instrument to his changed circumstances, has long been an object of solicitude to our laws.
The principle of protecting children thus left unprovided for
did not originate with us nor with the common law, but owes its
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existence to the civil law. It was thought or assumed that the
parent had forgotten the child, or had by accident overlooked
the fact that he had had offspring since the making of the will,
or that issue might be born after his death. The civil law
therefore disregarded such a will in order to enable the posthumous child to participate in the property left by its father.
That principle was adopted by the common law, and at an early
date by our own law.
Under the civil law great latitude was allowed children in
contesting the provisions of the parent'. will. A son might
attack his father's will on the ground that he was not sufficiently provided for, and wills were frequently set aside on that
ground. Naturally, the law was especially vigilant to protect
the rights of posthumous children or of children born after the
making of a will. If a man made a will and died, and a son
was born after his death, it was necessary for him to disinherit the child expressly to keep it out of the inheritance.
Otherwise the birth of the child revoked the will and invalidated it entirely.
Gaius counsels the testator to disinherit the child by meanA
of this formula, "Let whatever son may be born to me be disinherited." (Gaius ii, z30-132.)
The common'law, with its customary suspicion of the civil
law, was long in adopting this doctrine, and then adopted it
only in part. For the common law said that in the case of a
will of personalty, subsequent marriage and birth of issue conjointly revoked the will. The birth of a posthumous child
alone would not. It was not until 1771 that it was settled at
the common law in England that a will disposing of realty was
revoked by subsequent marriage and birth of issue.
The law of Pennsylvania progressed more rapidly. In
1748 (February 4, Miller's Laws, 22) the legislature enacted
that if a person made a will and afterwards married or had a
child or children, and then died leaving a child "not named
in any such will, even though a posthumous child, the will
should be revoked as to such child. And this act applied to
lands as well as to personalty. This act, however, was repealed in 1764, and a new act passed which contained a similar
provision, but substituted the words "not provided for in such
will" for the words "not named in any such -will." It is obvious that until the passage of the Act of 1764, March 23
(Hall and Sellers, 309), if a testator made a will and died, and
had issue born after the making of the will or after his death,
it was a sufficient compliance with the law if the child was
named or mentioned in the will. The intention of the legislature in making this change in phraseology has been the cause
of much discussion in the cases since-decided. These statutes,
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however, were undoubtedly intended for remedial statutes. In
1794 (April 19, 3 Sm. L. 152, Sec. 23) the legislature reenacted these provisions of the Act of 1764. The first case that
arose under the Act of 1794, and apparently the first case in
which the construction of provisions for posthumous children
was involved, was the-case of Coates v. Hughes, 3 Binn. 5o9,
I8II. Yeates, J., says in that case, " It cannot be denied that
the inconveniences resulting from the state of the common
law produced this section of the Act of April, 1794. Marriage
alone and birth of children alone were not sufficient to operate
the revocation of a previous will, and however strongly the inclination of the courts was with the children, they held that
they could not set aside a solemn will because some of the children were left unprovided for." 5 T. R. 54, note; 4 Burr,
2171, 2182. And Chief Justice Tilghman in the same case
says, "In the year 1764 the legislature'of Pennsylvania, being
struck, in consequence of an event which took place in the city
of Philadelphia, with the imperfection of the common law as
then understood, made a provision for all cases which could
occur under a subsequent marriage." What this event was
will be shown later.
The facts before the court in Coates v. Hughes were these:
The testator had made a will giving his personal property to his
wife, and dividing his real property among three persons, his
brother, sister, and a friend. His wife died without issue and
he remarried. By his second wife he had a son, born after his
death. The marriage and birth of issue was held to work i
revocation of the will pro tanto, the court allowing provisions
for the payment of debts and appointment of executors to
stand. In this case there was no difficulty. The contingency
provided for by the act had happened and the course to be pursued was plain. The case, however, is interesting as affording
some light upon the question of legislative intent.
The latest legislative provision upon the subject is that of the
Act of 1833, April 8, P. L. 249, Sec. 15, which reads:
"When any person shall make his last will and testament,
and afterwards shall marry or shall have a child or children
not provided for in such will, and die, leaving a widow or child
or children, although such child or children be born after the
death of their father, every such person, so far as shall regard
the widow, or child or children after-born, shall be deemed and
construed io die intestate; and such widow, child or children,
shall be entitled to such purparts, shares and dividends of the
estate, real and personal, of the deceased, as if he had actually
died without any will."
The precise meaning of the words "not provided for in such
will" was directly involved in the cases of Coates's Appeal, 2

444

INOTES.

Pa. 129, 1845; and Jackson v. Jackson, 2 Pa. 212, 1845. In
Coates's Appeal the testator gave all his personalty -to his wife,
saying, " Having full confidence in my wife that she will leave
the surplus to be divided, at her decease, justly among my childi'en." The court held that these were precatory words and
created a trust, which the court would enforce for the benefit of
the children born after the making of the will. Consequently,
as the wife held the property, subject to the trust for the benefit
of the children, they were provided for within the meaning of
the Act of 1833, Sec. 15, above quoted. In Jackson v. Jackson
the testator gave his property to his wife and directed that she
should have the guardianship and tuition of any children afterborn. Upon the authority of Coates's Appeal it was decided
that the will created a trust enforceable at law; that if the legatee accepted the benefits conferred by the will, she must take
subject to the trust imposed; and, finally, that the after-born
children were "provided for."
These cases are valueless as authorities for this reason. The
Supreme Court, in the case of Pennock's Estate, 20 Pa. 268,
1853, repudiated the doctrine that mere precatory words or
words expressing confidence were sufficient to raise a trust, and
overruled Coates's Appeal and Jackson v. Jackson to that extent. (See also Boyle v. Boyle, 152 Pa. 128, 1893.) Now,
the case of Jackson v. Jackson was ruled upon the assumption
that there was a substantial provision for the after-born children in the will (the court saying, "The court, if necessary,
will fix the amount which may be required for the maintenance
and education of the children") in the trust supposedly raised
by the precatory words. As no trust was in fact created, there
was no provision whatever for after-born children, and the
proposition that "a guardian appointed is a providing for"
cannot be maintained. When the same question, substantially,
arose again the court felt free to repudiate such a doctrine.
The will in Walker v. Hall, 34 Pa. 483, 1859, provided, "Having the utmost confidence in the integrity of my wife, and believing that should a child be born to us, she will do the utmost
to rear it to the honor and glory of its parents." The testator
then devised all his real and personal property to his wife. A
child was born after the will was made. The court said, "This
is clearly no provision for his child, such as we have seen is
contemplated by thje Wills Act and the whole policy of our law.
This case may be considered as settling the meaning which
the court was subsequently to attach to the words "not provided for in such will." They were held to mean !" substantial
provision," for the will clearly shows that the testator had the
after-born child in mind and that he thought he was providing
for it. He gives his property to his wife and expresses confi-
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dence that she will rear it properly. If the act meant literally
"provided for," this was literally providing for it. But the
court, noting the change in phraseology in the earlier acts from
"not named" to "not provided for," considered that a significant fact, and decided that there must be a substantialprovision
for the after-born child., The doctrine of this case was adopted
in Hollingsworth's Appeal, 51 Pa. 518, 1866. The facts there
were very similar to those in Walker v. Hall, but, in fact, presented a much stronger case. The maker of the will gave all
his real and personal property to his wife in fee, and provided
that in case he should leave any children he constituted his wife
their guardian, committing to her entirely their "maintenance,
education, and future provision," and "which guardianshipI
intend and consider as a suitable and proper provision for such
child or children." Two children were born after the making
of the will, both of whom survived him, as did his wife. The
testator here left no doubt of his intention. The will was obviously made with the fifteenth section of the Wills Act in
mind. The court said the case was ruled by Walker v. Hall,
and adopted the language of that case; this was "no provision
for his children such as is contemplated by our Wills Act and
the whole policy of the law."
In Edwards'sAppeal, 47 Pa. 144, 1864, both the contingencies
contemplated by the Act of 1833 occurred. An unmarried man
by will directed the sale of his real and personal estate, the investment of the proceeds, and the payment of the interest to a
lady whom he afterwards married; at her death the principal
was to go to the heirs of her body. It will be seen that an
estate tail was thus created which the Act of 1833 rendered inoperative. The devise was to A for life, remainder to the heirs
of her body. A child was born after the death of the testator.
The court held that the subsequent marriage revoked the will
as to his wife; that as the life estate thereby became void, the
remainder founded upon it must fall. It was said in the opinion, however, that "if the devise as to the wife were not revoked by marriage the question would arise whether a contingent remainder was such a provision as the fifteenth section
of the statute contemplated and we should probably conclude
that it was not, for we believe the legislature meant a present
vested interest, not a contingent one."
The case did not invoie this point and did not decide it, but
it indicates the mind of the court as to the meaning of "not
provided for." In Willard's Estate, 68 Pa. 327, 1871; however, one of the questions raised was whether or not a revcarsionary interest was a provision for an after-born child within
the statute, and it 'was held that a reversionary interest was
not a providing for such as the spirit of the act required.
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The facts of that case were as follows: The testator gave
the income of $3o0o to his mother for life, the bequest at her
death to revert to his children and heirs. One-half of the residue of his estate was secured to the benefit of his wife, together
with the house and lot in which they resided, for life, valuing
the same at $7ooo. On the decease of his wife the bequest of
$7o0o was to revert to his heirs-at-law, share and share alike
"to those heirs who shall be living or entitled to be represented
in said estate." He died leaving his wife enceinte. The posthumous child was thus entitled to a reversionary interest. The
language of Mr. Justice Sharswood in this connection is significant. He said: "The statute does'not say fully or equally
provided for. It may be true that if it clearly appears by the
terms of the will that an after-born child was within the special
intention of the testator, if there was any provision, no matter
how inadequate, the words of the statute would be satisfied.
Where, however, an immediate provision is made for children
by name who are living at the date of the will, and the interest
which the after-born child takes is a reversion and by general
words and not by special description as an after-born child, it
would be a very strained construction to hold such a child to be
provided for. The Act of February 4, 1748-9, 2 Miller's Laws,
22, used the words 'not named in any such will.' The present
words, 'not provided for in any such will,' were first introduced by the Act of March 23, 1764, Hall and Sellers, 309, and
have been continued in all subsequent acts. It is probable that
the intention of the alteration was two-fold; first, that merely
naming without providing for after-born children would not be
sufficient, as was the case in Walker v. Hall, io Casey, 483;
and, secondly, if the after-born child would take with the other
children under general words, Tithout being specially named
or described, such dez4se or bequest -would be a provision.
"Here, however, there was in effect no present provision
whatever. For all the purpose of education and support, and
that for an indefinite period, this son is left entirely dependent
upon his mother unless, indeed, by a sale of his reversionary
interest. In Edwards's Appeal, ii Wright, 153, where there
was a subsequent marriage and birth of a child, and there was
devised to the lady who was afterwards married to the testator
a life estate with a contingent remainder to her children, it
was held that as the devise to the wife was revoked by the marriage, the remainder would fall with it; but Chief-Justice
Woodward remarked that, if this were so, "then the question
would arise whether a contingent remainder was such a provision as -the fifteenth section of the Wills Act contemplates, and
we should probably conclude that it was not, for we believe
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the legislature meant a present vested interest and not a
future and contingent one.
" But how could even a vested reversionary interest be a provision, unless by a present sale of such reversionary interest?
A contingent interest could also be sold. An interest may be
vested as in this case, although the period when it shall fall
into possession is uncertain. Such an interest could not be sold
for the maintenance and education of the minor except at an
enormous sacrifice. Yet what could an Orphans' Court do
under such circumstances? Refuse to sell and throw the child
for maintenance and education on the public; or make a scanty
provision for a short period for an immediate sacrifice of all his
future estate. We hold then that a reversionary interest,
whether vested or contingent, is not a provision for an afterborn child within the words or spirit of the statute."
There have been several cases falling directly within the
terms of the act-i. e., where the testator has made his will and
had issue born subsequently entirely unprovided for; there is
no difficulty in such cases, for by the act the will is revoked.
And it has been held that the act applies as well to the will of a
woman as to that of a man. McKnight v. Reed, i WVh. 213,
1835; Grosvenor v. Fogg, 81 Pa. 4oo, 1876; Robeno y. Morlatt, 136 Pa. 35, 1890; Wilson, v. Ott, i6o Pa. 433, 1894
Owens v. Haines, 19 Pa. 137, 1901.
From the review of the authorities construing Section x;
of the Act of 1833 it will be seen that the words "not provide-1
for" had, until the decision of Newlin's. Estate, 209 Pa. 4 5f.,
1904, come to have a fairly definite meaning, and that the coustruction of the act was in a certain sense fixed. The concl isions reached may be summarized thus:
T. The Act of 1833, Sec. 15, is a remedial act; this applies to
the Acts of 1794 and of 1764. Argument of Ingersoll and
Tilghman, C. J., Coates v. Hughes, 3 Binn. 5oo; Willarl's
Appeal, supra.; Argument of John G. Johnson, Fidelity Tr-t
Co.'s Appeal, 121 Pa. 13, 1888. Votes of the Assembly, N -I.
5, page 309.
2. Being a remedial act, intended to benefit the posthum.-.us
or after-born child, it is to be construed in his favor. Fidedty
Trust Company's Appeal, 121 Pa. 13, 1888.
3. The change in phraseology from "not named in such
will" to " not provided for in such will" was intended to
broaden the remedy. Coates v. Hughes, 3 Binn. 5oo; Votes
of Assembly, Vol. 5, page 309.
4. The words '" not provided for" mean
a. A substantial provision. Willard's Estate, Walker v
Hall.
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b. A present provision. Willard's Estate, Hollingsworth's
Appeal.
c. A vested interest. Willard's Estate, Walker v. Hall.
5. The words "not provided for" are not satisfied by
a. A contingent interest. Edwards's Appeal.
b. Even a vested interest by way of reversion. Willard's
Estate.
6. Merely naming without providing for after-born children is not sufficient. Walker v. Hall, Hollingsworth's Appeal.
7. If the after-born child would take with the other children
under general words, without being specially named or described, such devise or bequest would be a provision. Willard's Appeal.
8. The appointment of a guardian or a request to a legatee
to rear and educate the child, even if the latter be named or
described, is not a providing for within the meaning of the act.
Hollingsworth's Appeal.
These conclusions seem to be the result of the authorities
until the decision of Newlints Estate, 209 Pa. 456, i9o4. It
remains to examine whether" the facts of that case raised a
question, rules for the decision of which had not already been
formulated.
The will in that case devised property to trustees to pay the
income to the testator's wife "during the minority of my child
or children, and during the period in which my wife shall remain unmarried after my death, and in further trust, to convey, assign, transfer, set over, and pay to the trustees herein
named the share of each of my daughters upon reaching the
age of twenty-one or upon my wife remarrying, in trust, to
keep the shares of my daughters invested," etc. This was held
a sufficient provision for a daughter born after the date of the
will.
It is conceived that the court could have reached no other
conclusion in the case under the statement numbered (7)
above and laid down in Willard's Appeal. The rule is, "If
the after-born child would take under general words, without
being specially named or described, such devise or bequest
would be a provision." There would seem to be no difficulty
in classifying Newlit's Appeal under this statement of the
law. An active trust. was created under which the after-born
child is substantially provided for. The point actually raised
and decided is that "the creation of an active trust for the benefit of children by general words which would include afterborn children is a provision'for an after-born child within the
meaning of the act."
The difficulty is not so much in the decision itself, which
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would seem to be in accord with established principles, as in the
reasoning incidental to the decision. For the court goes further
than the facts necessitated and uses this language.
" This act makes no requirement that the child shall be fully
or adequately provided for. That is left to the discretion of
the parent, as in the case of living children. All that it does
require is that he shall have the child in mind and shall make
clear his intention that the will shall apply to it. Any provision which does that is sufficient and the inquiry, whether
large or small, equal-or unequal, vested or contingent, present
or future, is irrelevant and outside the jurisdiction of the courts
except so far as it tends to throw light on the question."
It is conceived that this language, instead of settling the law,
will render it more confused. These statements do not accord with the authorities. They are, moreover, in the nature of
dicta, and merely incidental to the decision itself. It is entirely
possible that should a case arise in which a posthumous child
was provided for in one of the ways hitherto regarded as insufficient,-e. g., by way of contingent remainder or reversion,
-that the statements above quoted would not be considered
authority and that the principles of the decided cases would be
held to govern.
Certainly the other cases seem to express the legislative intent and to be more in accord with reason and justice. It has
been seen that the act was intended to benefit the posthumous
or after-born child and that it should be construed accordingly.
It is true that the act does not require an adequate or full
provision. That might be beyond the power or means of the
parent. But if the act requires simply that the will shall show
that he has the child in mind and that he intends the will shall
apply to it, it does not differ in any respect from the Act of
1748-9, and gifts or provisions such as those made in Walker
v. Hall and Hollingsworth's Appeal should have been held
good.
To return for an instant to the older statutes, the common
law held that marriage and the birth of issue conjointly revoked a will, but this doctrine was held not to operate to let in
a pre-existing child not provided for. i Jarman on Wills, ch.
8, sec. i.
This doctrine was borrowed from the civil law and was applied by the ecclesiastical courts to wills of personalty only.
It was not until 1771 that it was definitely settled at common
law that a will of realty was revoked by subsequent marriage
and birth of issue. Christopherv. Christopher,4 Burr. 2x82.
Our earliest statute on the subject is that of 1748-9, which
required that when a man made a will and married, or had issue
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born subsequently, though posthumous, not named in any such
will, the will was revoked pro tanto. This statute was in
force until 1764, when it was repealed and a new act passed
containing the words "not provided for in such will." The
later Acts of 1794 and 1833 contain a similar provision. It
is obvious, therefore, that since 1748 our courts have been
constrained to follow, not the common law rule, but that of

our statutes.
The tendency of the English'law is shown by the Act of i
Vict. ch. 26, sec. 18, which provides that "every will made by a
man or woman shall be revoked by his or her marriage (except
a will made in the exercise of a power of appointment), when
the real or personal estate thereby appointed would not, in default of such appointment, pass to his or her heir, executor, or
administrator, or the person entitled as his or her next of kin
under the statute distributions; and (Sec. x9) that " no %ill
shall be revoked by any presumption of an intention on the
ground of an alteration in ciicumstances."
The present English rule is stated by Jarman thus (vol. x,
ch. 7, sec. x):
1st, That, unless in the expressly excepted cases, marriage
alone will produce absolute and complete revocation as to both
real and personal estate; and that no declaration, however explicit and earnest, of the testator's wish that the will should
continue in force after marriage, still less any inference of intention drawn from the contents of the will, and, least of all,
evidence collected aliunde, will prevent a revocation.
2d, That merely the birth of a child, whether provided for
by the will or not, will not revoke it, the legislature, while it invested with a revoking efficacy one of the several circumstances
formerly requisite to produce a revocation, having wholly discarded the other.
It appears, then, that the present English rule is that subsequent marriage will revoke a will, but subsequent birth of issue
will not. These statements show clearly that the English law
has developed in a different manner from our own and for
that reason is of no assistance as an analogy.
But the reason for the change of phraseology from "not
named" to "not provided for" in the earlier statutes might
afford some light. In Newlin's Estate, 209 Pa. 456, the court
says, page 462, "On the difference of phrase between the Act
of x748 and the later acts, the change (from "not named" to
" not provided for") is better accounted for by the suggestion
of Sharswood, J., in Willard's Estate, 68 Pa. 327, that the
child might be provided for by general words including other
children without being individually named."
But the objection to this theory is that it apparently cannot
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be reconciled with the facts connected with the passage of the
Act of 1764.
It will be recalled that in the quotation from the opinion of
Tilghman, C. J., in Coates v. Binney he said (supra), " In the
year 1764, the legislature of Pennsylvania being struck, in consequence of an event which took place in the city of Philadelphia, with the imperfection of the common law as then understood, made a provision for all cases which could oecur under
a subsequent marriage." Now, the event thus alluded to that
led to the passage of the Act of 1764 was this: In January,
1764,-"A petition from Messrs. Thomas and Charles Willing, of
the City of Philadelphia, merchants, was presented to the
House (of Assembly) and read, setting forth that the petitioners are sons and devisees of Charles Willing, late of this
city,. Esq., deceased, who, at the time of his death, was seized
of divers houses, lots and lands in the City of Philadelphia, the
greatest part of which he, by his last will, devised to the petitioners; that the petitioners' said father has left two children,
born after making his said will, who are minors, and entitled,
under a late Act of Assembly of this Province, to Two
Elevenths Parts of the said houses and lands devised to the petitioners in the same manner as if there had been no will made;
that the petitioners are deprived of the benefit both of.improving
and making sale of any of the said real estate so devised to
them, by means of the said Minor Children's.Claims; and no
Partition thereof can be made without manifest injury to the
whole ;-that the petitioners are advised that the Act of Assembly aforesaid (Act of 1748), entitled, 'An Act for amending
the Laws relating to the Partition and Distribution of Intestates' Estates,' does not in the Petitioners' case with sufficient
certainty empower the Orphans' Court to order appiaisement
and valuation of such lands, whereof Partition cannot be made
without prejudice to the whole, as that Court is empowered to
do in the case of persons dying wholly intestate; wherefore the
Petitioners humbly pray the House to afford them the aid of the
Legislature in the premises, by expressly authorizing the
Orphans' Court to order a valuation and appraisement to be
made of the houses, lots and lands, so devised to the petitioners,
and that on payment of the Proportionable Parts of the Real
Estate thereof or securing the same to be'paid to the children,
they may be barred of all right and title to the same houses and
lands or in any other manner that to the house shall seem most
proper." (Votes of the Assembly, vol. 5, page 309.)
On February i a committee was appointed to prepare and
bring in a bill for the purpose expressed in the said petition,
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and also " for amending the laws in force relating to the Partition and Distribution of intestates' Estates."
After an act had been prepared to carry out the purpose expressed in the said petition, it was re-committed to the com"nittee with orders to revise the entire law, that is, not only as
zo partition, but as to the provisions for revocation of wills by
marriage or subsequent birth of issue, and " to make such additions thereto as may be necessary in order that the said supplement may be repealed."
The act finally passed was entitled "A supplement to the
act entitled ' An Act for the better settling Intestates' Estates,
and for repealing one other act of General Assembly of this
Province, entitled, "An Act for amending the laws relating to
the partition and distribution of Intestates' Estates." III
The petition above set forth shows that the subsequent birth
of issue was in 1764 regarded as working not a total revocation but only a revocation pro tanto of the will. The action
of the legisiature in providing, thereupon, for all the cases
which could occur under a subsequent marriage shows that the
legislature thought the existing provisions inadequate and
meant the act to remedy that inadequacy. There is other evidence, such as the reports of the secretaries in Great Britain
on the Acts of 1764-5, that shows that this act was intended to
broaden the remedy and certainly not to restrict it. (See notes
to the Act of 1764 in the Statutes at Large.) The.principle
adopted from the civil law and seen in all the statutes and decided cases is thatof a change of intent implied from the change
of conditions or of circumstances. That this was the principle
can be seen in the words of the statute of i Vict.. supra. The
meaning that the court now wishes to give to the change in
phraseology in the Act of 1764 is that the legislature was seeking to relieve the testator of the hardship of having to name,
actually, the posthumous or after-born child, and to permit the
will to stand, if by any possibility the court could read into it
an imaginary intention of the testator to provide for the child
by general words. The most casual glance at the history of
the legislature shows that that is precisely what the legislature
was trying not to do. They were trying to pass a law for the
benefit of the wife and of the after-born child, and that is the
construction that should be given to it.
The facts in connection with the passage of the Act of 1764
are interesting for two reasons.
First, because they show that the decision in Coates v.
Hughes, that subser:uent marriage or birth of issue worked
only a revocation pro tan to, was undoubtedly in accord with
legislative intent.
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Second, because they show that the statute was intended to
broaden the remedy provided in the Act of 1748-9.

The legitimate result of this examination of the authorities
seems to be:
i. That the Act of 1833, sec. 15, and the acts to which it is
supplementary, were intended to secure a substantial provision
for after-born or posthumous children.
2. That it is a remedial statute and should be construed in
favor of posthumous or after-born children.
3. That it is not sufficient that the testator shows that he had
the child in mind and intended his will to apply to it, but that
he must make a real and substantial provision for it.
4. That the statute does create an inequality between children living at the time of the making of the will and those
after-born, in that the testator can, if lie wish, neglect the
former entirely, but cannot do so with the latter.
To which should be added the eight propositions above
stated that have been laid down from time to time by the
authorities.
If the statute mean any less than this, it differs little in effect
from the Act of 1748-9, which merely required naming the
after-born child, but not providing for it. Furthertilore, if the
statute embarrass the courts, in requiring a provision for such
children, the remedy would seem to be with the legislature and
not with the courts.
G.F.D.

